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A long-term book the making of would not Combine used in what is a other shift creation without a marketing of performances. The limitations of this approach were clear by the end of the s. Since then, scholars have engaged in a series of explicit critiques of the earlier, binary, and monolithic view of development, by emphasizing the greater diversity and complexity of this history. It also requires historians not only to look at metropolitan archives but also to integrate insights drawn from archives and sources found in locations where development interventions were put into effect.
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If neoliberalism and the end of the Cold War set the stage for the first wave of writing the history of development, the dramatic events and fallout of September 11, , provide the essential backdrop for understanding the more recent historiographical moves that have marked the field. The new development historiography also promises to provide a more global and transnational investigation of ideas and linkages beyond the Western, especially American, experience, as researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds and subfields take a greater interest in the subject.
The problem of weak or failed states brought greater exposure to the importance of institutions and to questions of institutional reform, which fostered a new appreciation for setting the complexities and challenges of nation and state capacity building within a broader historical context. The new market-oriented lending policies and structural adjustment programs SAPs introduced by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank during the global debt crisis appeared to have caused greater harm than good in many developing countries.
In order to re-establish their creditworthiness, indebted countries were cajoled into drastic reductions of public spending and subsidies, privatization of state enterprises, and currency devaluations. At the same time, developing countries were encouraged to reorient their economies to export intensification and open participation in the world market. And yet the new global economy turned out to be as unstable as the old one.
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the increasing integration of these regions into the world market was accompanied by a marked rise of divisive nationalism, ethnic violence, and social upheaval. For the journalist Robert Kaplan such instability seemed symptomatic of a world on the precipice of social and political anarchy in which the old twentieth-century international framework of sovereign nation-states was being overwhelmed by new, unconventional security threats such as overpopulation, environmental degradation, disease, and mass migrations.
The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940 (Electronic book text)
The September terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon appeared to confirm such dire predictions. In the aftermath of the tragedy, the United States faced a moment of reckoning. The problem of failed or failing states, which might harbor global terrorist organizations and base camps, could no longer be ignored or relegated to the far reaches of American suzerainty. In the aftermath of the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, postconflict resolution and nation building became the central planks of U. The renewed emphasis on the strategic connection between security and development began to erode the previously unquestioned faith in market fundamentalism, posing a challenge to the already tottering neoliberal dream of reducing and privatizing the state.
Political analysts like Francis Fukuyama responded by laying out the case for putting the state back on the agenda. In a significant reframing of his earlier position, Fukuyama argued that September 11 had reminded the world community of the problem of weak states and the need for state building, especially in the developing world.
The resulting collapse of public administration and growing threats to international order had delivered a painful lesson that institutions and governance matter. It considers itself responsible not just for waging a war against terrorism and rogue states, but also for spreading the benefits of capitalism and democracy overseas.
Now we are living through the collapse of many of these former colonial states. Into the resulting vacuum of chaos and massacre a new imperialism has reluctantly stepped—reluctantly because these places are dangerous and because they seemed, at least until Sept. But gradually, this reluctance has been replaced by an understanding of why order needs to be brought to these places.
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Terror has collapsed distance, and with this collapse has come a sharpened American focus on the necessity of bringing order to the frontier zones. Bringing order is the paradigmatic imperial task, but it is essential, for reasons of both economy and principle, to do so without denying local peoples their rights to some degree of self-determination. The plea by writers like Ferguson and Ignatieff for a new imperialism dovetailed nicely with the revival of interest in the concept of empire, not only among historians but by other researchers in fields such as area studies, literary studies, and discourse analysis.
Just when imperial history appeared to be on its last legs, a new cohort of scholars, influenced by theoretical perspectives drawn from poststructuralism and postcolonial studies, helped lead a resurgence of the field in the late s. After an initially chilly reception, many imperial historians came to recognize the relevance of postcolonial theory and to incorporate its insights into their work.
Conceptually, the new imperial history challenged earlier, binary models of imperial relations by placing metropole and colony within a single analytical frame or field of analysis in which those relations are viewed as mutually constitutive. Culture and identity in the metropole were just as much shaped and imbricated by empire as the colonies themselves.
Comparisons were inevitably drawn between earlier imperial endeavors and the heightened U. With the Cold War fading from view and the liberal multilateralism of the postwar nation-state system in crisis, some argued that the world was reverting to an earlier, imperial form of geopolitical relations. Without this the liberal imperial project was bound to fail. Parallels with the earlier, Cold War framework of modernization and nation-building efforts in regions such as Southeast Asia have not been lost on critics.
But even for those wary of making overly generalized analogies to empires of old, there has still been a recognition of the importance of placing more recent statebuilding projects in a wider historical context: a history that runs deeper than President George W. In the twentieth century, development became a universally accepted goal of all nation-states, and one of the core missions of the United Nations system. Reconstructing this history of expectation, disappointment, and delusion, and its roots in earlier colonial state-building projects, has become the goal of an expanding cohort of scholars.
It also seeks implicitly to discover the lessons and elements of the development project that might be worth salvaging or wisely avoiding. The importance of studying actual development interventions and practices of the past has been highlighted, as has the question of whether such interventions achieved their intended goals or not, and with what lasting effects. One of the key shifts in the development historiography over the last decade and a half has been the move away from the truncated view of earlier scholars who saw development as a post or post project.
There is a determination to look beyond the Cold War to earlier and different contexts, especially colonial precursors, to find the origins of the development framework.
In the case of Britain, the problem of domestic unemployment, the campaign for tariff reform, and the extension of imperial preferences drove debates concerning the development of the empire in the early twentieth century. Other contributing factors traced by these works, which led Britain and France to adopt more extensive plans for colonial reform and reconstruction, include the Great Depression, international scrutiny of colonial rule, growing anticolonial discontent, and the impact of World War II.
Although this earlier literature provides valuable insights into the political institutions and mechanisms of imperial policy, its authors tend to accept colonial ideas about development at face value and view them uncritically as part of an unfolding process of administrative and economic change. Rarely do these analyses inquire into the changing and varied meanings of development or draw parallels between their work and contemporary policy debates. What differentiates more recent scholarship from these earlier accounts is the way it approaches development, viewing it as an assemblage of shifting meanings, interventions, and practices that needs to be interrogated and unraveled, and which has relevance for policy today.
This more reflective approach began with the pioneering works of Cowen and Shenton and Cooper, but since the early s the number of studies has grown exponentially. For both Moon and Hodge, the foundations of developmentalist thinking, at least in the colonial context, extend back to the turn of the century when the British and Dutch, along with other European powers, embarked on a new approach to their colonial empires. In the Dutch case, colonial reformers and critics argued that the welfare of the indigenous people should be the first priority of the Netherlands East Indies government.
The Chamberlainite program involved capital investment in railways and other infrastructural projects, as well as technical assistance and research in the areas of tropical medicine and tropical agriculture. What is striking in both cases is the close association that was established among science, technology, and development by those reformers and officials who stood at the hub of the late colonial state-building projects in Africa and Asia. Both Moon and Hodge emphasize the existence of competing agendas of power and multiple and conflicting programs and interests operating within the colonial state itself.
Although authorities tended to favor rural and agricultural development, this does not mean there was not dissension and conflicting standpoints.
Moon, for example, points to debates between the Department of Public Works and the new Department of Agriculture over which agency could best deliver agricultural improvement, with the former championing large-scale irrigation works, while the latter favored a small-scale approach aimed at introducing new crop varieties. The colonial development and welfare acts of the s were informed by a kind of neo-Malthusian crisis narrative that gained popularity in the years leading up to the war. The outcome of these debates and intrusions, as Moon stresses, was often different from what was intended, and in her case quite contrary to the generalizations made about colonialism in the previous literature on development discourse.
Although large-scale, homogeneous technologies were advocated by some as a way of increasing agricultural production, she shows how the agricultural extension service and the colonial government in the Netherlands East Indies generally eschewed such an approach, preferring instead to employ multiple strategies and small-scale solutions, adapted to local ecological conditions and agricultural practices.
Rather than encouraging the industrialization and urbanization of colonial peoples, as Arturo Escobar and Gilbert Rist would suggest, these policies and schemes were designed to slow down and even reverse such a process. Finally, although the initiatives promoted by Dutch and British colonial officials often met with disappointing or unexpected ends, and sometimes outright failures, the framework and beliefs that underpinned such initiatives would have lasting influence on development thinking well beyond the postwar era.
Moon suggests that the corps of indigenous agriculture extension experts, trained in the Dutch colonial tradition of gathering detailed knowledge of local conditions and variability, continued to play an active role in the early development efforts of the Indonesian state. Years of practical knowledge and field experience also made them ideal recruits for the burgeoning network of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank.
As the works by Moon and Hodge suggest, the new colonial development historiography sees important continuities stretching across the colonial-postcolonial divide. Despite the political realignments brought about by decolonization and the Cold War, a number of recent studies have highlighted the persistence of attitudes about modernity and models of authoritarian social engineering that were first initiated by colonial rulers in the s and s but which continued to hold value for development practitioners and national elites until the s.
This is not to suggest that there were no significant disjunctures between colonial and postcolonial approaches. Indeed, for several researchers it is the ruptures, rather than the resonances, that seem more salient. Inspired by the Kariba Dam, which was built in the s one hundred kilometers upstream in the Central African Federation, Cahora Bassa was constructed by the Portuguese in the early s during the final years of colonial rule.
And more recently, the Mozambican government has commenced planning for another project, first proposed during the colonial era, to build a second dam sixty kilometers downstream at Mphanda Nkuwa.
It is a history that stretches back to the reunification of Vietnam under the Nguyen dynasty in the early nineteenth century and which continued during French colonial rule with the dredging of new inland waterways and canals and the building of other infrastructure projects, during the growth years from to Both the Isaacmans and Biggs stress the importance of looking at these development experiences from a broader social and spatial perspective.
The Isaacmans are predominantly interested in the experiences of the African peasants and rural communities living along the Zambezi River, rather than the policy frameworks of colonial planners and development experts. For local riverine communities, traditional alluvial farming has become more precarious and in some areas unsustainable, which in turn has caused greater food insecurity and male labor migration to work on nearby plantations or in urban centers. Biggs also concentrates on the broader effects of the hydraulic management of a river system.
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